UKR: Russia using mesh networks to enhance Shaheds

Presented by FTI Consulting

BLUF: Russia is increasingly using mesh-networking technology in long-range Geran (aka Shahed) drones to transform them from simple attack drones aimed at static targets into a distributed web of strike platforms capable of relaying data to one another and striking targets deep inside Ukraine.

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Since November, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been recording the systematic use of mesh modems in Shahed/Geran drones. 

These modems allow Russian operators to control UAVs from a distance of about 600 km, forming communication networks that make them harder to disrupt, more maneuverable, and more precise. 

These modified Shaheds have onboard cameras that can transmit video even further than typical. They are also able to detect air defense systems, along with moving trains or other targets, which they can then strike while evading interceptors. 

It has become more difficult for Ukraine to repel such attacks. On Jan. 27, for instance, a Russian Shahed drone struck a civilian train in the Kharkiv region – while it was moving. This drone was believed to have been steered thanks to a mesh modem (or Starlink), according to military radio technology expert and Defense Ministry advisor Serhii Beshrestnov. Five people were killed as a result of this attack.

Direct communication through mesh networks gives Shahed operators a wide range of new capabilities: they can conduct reconnaissance, transmit video from deep inside Ukraine, adjust routes during flight, and even control the drone in real-time (although the Shahed has poor maneuverability due to its design).

Moscow’s endgame is to create an extensive system that will allow swarms of Shaheds to be controlled deep in Ukrainian territory, says Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi, development director at the electronic warfare systems developer ‘Fly Group.’ 

"I assume the enemy dreams of creating the ability to transmit data to a Shahed at any moment, to, for example, change its action during flight," said Khrapchynskyi. "That is, you don't need to control it in real-time. You just need an operator who will control a group of drones to perform tasks."

A mesh network with special modems provides wireless communication similar to home Wi-Fi, where any device can serve as a repeater. 

For example, a smartphone connects to a Wi-Fi router, and in turn enables a hotspot function to distribute internet to a laptop in a neighboring apartment, which then connects to a tablet in the next building, and so on.

Every Shahed with a mesh-router in the network simultaneously receives the necessary data (for example: video, altitude, distance, signal strength, battery charge) and retransmits it down the chain, Khrapchynskyi explained. This significantly improves the weapon's capabilities because if one of the UAVs is destroyed, traffic can be redirected through other nearby drones.

When only ground antennas are used, communication with a drone is usually lost beyond the line-of-sight range. The mesh network extends operational range by adding nodes.

Russia tested and refined the technology throughout 2024 on cheaper Gerbera drones, which conducted reconnaissance over Kyiv and even deeper in Ukrainian territory, Beskrestnov said in November. They then began using it with Shaheds once they saw how effective the technology was.

The operation of a mesh network requires modems that cost about $7,000 each. Russia is believed to have ordered large batches of these components from China to build a network. Beskrestnov sounded the alarm last November and December over the deployment of a large-scale mesh network for Shaheds using radio-electronic reconnaissance systems.

The Russian army will launch Shahed, Gerbera, and smaller relay drones, combining them into one large mesh network, wrote Serhii.

A Shahed has 30 km of guaranteed quality communication within the range of other drones, Khrapchynskyi estimated. Flight path diagrams show that Shaheds maintain a distance of approximately 4 km from other members of the group.

Mesh networks still require ground control stations to operate, and communication towers have been built in southern Belarus along the border with Ukraine to form the first communication channel for drones attacking Ukraine, Khrapchynskyi said. 

President Volodymyr Zelensky has also warned that Russian operators launch Shaheds and maintain communication with them to attack Ukraine from Belarus.

Repeaters for Russian drones can also be set up on Ukrainian territory and connected to local internet networks, which is a huge problem, said Anton Hetman, CTO of Ukrainian-Estonian company Teletactica, which produces communication systems for military drones. This would strengthen communication far from the border, where mesh networks work slowly, he told The Arsenal. 

Russian agents can even rent a house near Kyiv or in another region, create a communication node, connect it to a fiber optic network, and transmit information to Shaheds or all the way back to Russia. It’s like a phone connecting to local Wi-Fi in an area where the mobile network connection is weak.

Beskrestnov reported that Russians are already trying to install repeaters for Shaheds on Ukrainian territory. To achieve this, they are scheming to get residents of private houses to install small devices on their property, likely by tricking elderly people or otherwise vulnerable people to do so. 

Shaheds can use LTE modems and SIM cards as an additional communication channel to transmit information through mobile networks when the mesh network fails. This also allows for establishing geolocation.

Using big directional antennas on the ground, the Russians transmit signals to the first Shahed in the chain, which serves as a repeater for the others. Typically, the first drone flies in circles near the Ukrainian border because it needs to be within 100 km of the base station.

The next drone in the chain can be located up to 30-40 km away for video transmission and up to 100 km for telemetry data transmission (altitude, speed, distance, etc.). Overall, the mesh network provides Shaheds with an operational range of 600-700 km, according to Khrapchynskyi.

As the number of nodes–or drones–increases, network bandwidth decreases, said Hetman from Teletactica. That’s why there can’t be more than 3-4 UAVs in the chain during an attack. 

At the same time, frame rates, or frames per second, decrease due to signal delays at long distances, making it harder for the operator to strike targets with precision in remote control mode. Telemetry data transmission requires much less speed, so operators can still receive and send small data packs at greater distances for reconnaissance.

Network operational range depends on modem power, according to Hetman. With directional antennas, the distance from the ground control station to the first drone-node can exceed 100 km, as signals are focused by reflectors with strong amplification (24-30 dB) and directed in a beam form. The UAV must thus be at a very high altitude to be within line of sight.

Because each Shahed connected to the mesh network shares information with the others, they are able to determine which routes are safe, where Ukrainians are shooting down enemy drones or suppressing their communications. Operators can use the onboard cameras to see the location of mobile fire groups, missile systems, or potential targets.

Russians take this data into account while planning each new mission, changing the route or altitude accordingly. The operator can also immediately order an attack on a target in response to circumstances on the ground. In the Chernihiv region, for instance, a Shahed struck a mobile air defense group that was trying to shoot it down in December. There have also been cases when Russian drones tried to hit Ukrainian helicopters in the air.

Russia has been known to launch hundreds of UAVs simultaneously to gather as much information as possible about where targets and air defense positions are located. One Shahed can detect threats so that others in the chain can change their route or flight altitude.

"I think they're trying to create tools that allow them to form a breakthrough group, escort group, and reconnaissance group," said Khrapchynskyi.

The mesh network allows various types of weapons to be installed on Shaheds so that the operator can aim and command to strike in real time. 

A Russian drone shot down in Ukraine just a few weeks ago was found to have a 'Verba' MANPADS attached to it, a man-portable infrared homing surface-to-air missile designed to destroy aircraft. This was likely intended to be used for shooting down a Ukrainian aircraft or helicopter.

This MANPADS is pre-set to target acquisition and launch mode, Beskrestnov noted. The operator just needs to direct the drone towards the target and send a command, leading to missile launch.

The key is striking these chains where they begin: drone-repeaters that fly in circles near the border should be destroyed immediately, said Khrapchynskyi. 

That will cut off the communication channels they form for the entire swarm flying deep into Ukraine. 

When that data transmission chain breaks, Shaheds go back to just being loitering munitions.

Detecting Shaheds is also crucial. Electronic reconnaissance systems and even small radio analyzers can easily detect them due to the high signal power of mesh modems, Khrapchynskyi explained. Air defense can then find them, track and destroy them with interceptor drones or other weapons. 

Pocket devices for radio spectrum analysis also detect the operation of both repeaters and strike drones, Beskrestnov noted. But Ukrainian air defense forces must be prepared for any Shahed to spot them and attack their position, making camouflage absolutely crucial.

Electronic warfare systems can also be used to suppress the mesh network, Khrapchynskyi said, but installing a sufficient number of conventional jammers is difficult now due to electricity shortages, so a smart system is needed to detect ground control stations in Russia or Belarus and suppress any communication.

"If we just interrupt ground communication systems, the entire network collapses because it loses its source. It's like unplugging the internet cable from the modem," explained Khrapchynskyi.

This could be done with Ukraine’s ‘Pokrova’ system, which works by spoofing satellite navigation signals but was never fully implemented due to a lack of money and electrical power. It envisioned detecting and suppressing any communication channels with Russian drones.

Khrapchynskyi pointed out that the reason Russia is transitioning Shaheds to mesh networks is because of how effective electronic warfare has been in Ukraine. 

They struggled for a long time to overcome GPS navigation suppression, but then went an entirely different route.

Ukraine learned to jam mesh modems with frequencies of 1.3-1.5 GHz, and the Russians switched to 3-4 GHz. While it would be possible to suppress all possible mesh network ranges, this would require massive investments that Ukrainian developers simply don't have.

Ukraine can also use Russia’s own tactics to fight back and deploy mesh systems for more effective drone strikes on Russia, but there is currently no indication of this practice on a mass scale. European and American alternatives exist for building such networks, but they are expensive. Teletactica is currently working on developing such technology, said Hetman.

Creating a modem with military-grade MESH/MANET technologies is a complex task that requires significant resources, time, and highly-qualified specialists. It's also difficult for Ukrainians to legally obtain the required components right now. Russia and China have established supply chains for similar American-made components for use in their modems, said Hetman.

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