BLUF: The effectiveness of drones against tanks in Ukraine has not dampened the EU’s efforts to design a common next-generation Main Battle Tank (MBT) that is modular and interoperable. A key element is including features for anti-drone defenses and drone-like remote-fire weapons. 

EXCLUSIVE: Germans, Poles and Spaniards are generally skeptical of a “buy European” approach to defense procurement, according to a YouGov survey.

Re: increased defense spending, the survey shows broad support across the political spectrum in Poland, a stark left-right split in Spain, and skepticism among far-right voters in France and Germany—and far-left voters in Italy.

The European Commission has announced a €1 billion equity fund for defense tech as well as a new grant scheme, but key details remain to be seen—such as the eligibility criteria and the maximum size of each investment.

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The spectacle of cheap drones destroying scores of expensive tanks in Ukraine has led some people to ask if tanks are still useful.

The EU isn’t one of them: Its European Defense Fund (EDF) has committed €40 million to research projects for next-generation tanks, for which counter-drone technology will be essential.

“Tanks used properly still have a utility,” Emil Archambault, a fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, told The Arsenal. “If you have a breakthrough, and you need to exploit it quickly, tanks are still useful”—if part of a combined-arms operation.

In Ukraine, tanks have taken the place of artillery along the largely static frontline. That makes them particularly vulnerable to drones, but that doesn’t mean it’s the end of the road for tanks. 

New threats demand new countermeasures

“It's always a game of offensive measure and countermeasure,” Archambault said. “You saw more penetrative charges against tanks, and then you saw reactive armor to counter that.”

Next-generation tanks will be designed with lessons from Ukraine in mind.

The EU wants them produced in Europe as part of a beefed-up industrial base—not imported from foreign allies like the United States and South Korea. 

The hope is that the economic benefits can be distributed across Europe due to greater opportunities for component manufacturing. But Germany—whose KNDS and Rheinmetall lead the European market for tank manufacturing—arguably stands to gain the most.

There is also a push to replace the mishmash of tank models in Europe with something more harmonized and interoperable. A common system could unify and simplify the market for components, helping to lower costs, speed production, and develop pan-European economies of scale.

“We need European tanks,” Oscar Guccione, a defense researcher at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, told The Arsenal. Just as important is “having a fully updated one, with anti-drone technology, and coupled with drone technology.”

That means tanks equipped not only with counter-drone defenses, but also accompanied by remote-controlled or even semi-autonomous weapons. 

The EDF funds two next-gen tank projects. The German-led Main ARmored Tank of Europe (MARTE) is a two-year project for designing concepts — but not developing prototypes — for a new Main Battle Tank (MBT) platform. 

The French-led Technologies for Existing and Future MBTs (FMBTech), on the other hand, is a three-year effort to identify technologies for use in a modular tank system. 

Both projects launched in the last 12 months, with EDF grants of €20 million each.

Archambault noted some of the benefits smaller companies might enjoy if these projects eventually lead to a modular, next-gen European MBT.

“In Germany, we see companies like ARX Robotics that are producing autonomous or remote-controlled ground vehicles. That's a very specific capability,” he said.

“Pretty much every company is exploring some form” of counter-drone technology, he added. “They're not all producing only in-house; it might be collaboration with other companies.”

Both MARTE and FMBTech are short-term exercises in research and design. Neither project will actually develop a prototype. Guccione speculated that they could one day be merged. Getting MARTE to the prototype stage would cost up to €1 billion, according to Guccione’s estimates, and full-scale development would be almost €10 billion.

France and Germany have been collaborating since 2017 on a longer-term project outside of the EDF, called the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), which aims to replace Germany’s Leopard 2 and the French Leclerc by the mid-2040s.

In contrast to MARTE and FMBTech, MGCS is an exclusively Franco-German project that involves four companies: Germany’s Rheinmetall, KNDS Germany, KNDS France, and France’s Thales.

Unlike the EU’s modular design approach, MGCS aims to develop an integrated combat system—not just a tank, but also an infantry combat vehicle, a missile carrier, and a missile-carrying support fire vehicle, Archambault said.

Not another FCAS

The long-term risk is that national interests will get in the way of European interests; defense industrial policy is a frequent cause of pork-barrel politics.

An obvious example is the beleaguered Future Combat Air System (FCAS), a joint venture between France, Germany, and Spain to develop a next-generation fighter jet supported by fast-moving aerial drones. FCAS has been hobbled by infighting, with France demanding control over the majority of the workload. 

MGCS “is very much a mirror of the FCAS project,” Archambault said. “It’s run a bit differently and seems to be running a bit better,” though he noted that, eight years into the project, the partners still can’t agree on a main cannon.

MARTE and FMBTech may be more modest in their ambitions than MGCS, but they also involve a lot more countries and companies.

The large number of participants gives Guccione hope that MARTE will have some impact—if not leading to the development of a common tank, then at least providing a basis for closer cooperation in military R&D. 

Archambault doubts there will ever be a single tank for all of Europe, but that doesn’t mean there won’t be closer cooperation. 

EU members such as France and Sweden have a strong incentive to support a joint effort on next-gen tanks. Their current stock will need updating—France, for instance, stopped producing Leclerc tanks in 2008—and development of new systems is expensive.

“In terms of tank producers in Europe, there’s not that many left,” Archambault said, highlighting Rheinmetall and KNDS. “The market is very consolidated, which pushes for cooperation in procurement.” 

Other insiders are more skeptical. A source in a major European defense firm, who asked to remain anonymous to speak candidly, told The Arsenal that the EDF tank projects are the result of countries excluded from MGCS, such as Italy, looking for other ways to get in on the action.

“EDF is an opportunistic approach to trying to enter the market via EU money,” the source said. “It's not the EU's fault. The problem is that 27 nations are trying to be in the driver's seat.”

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Europeans are generally skeptical when asked if it was better to buy defense equipment within the EU when cheaper or better alternatives are available elsewhere. This is according to a survey by YouGov, shared exclusively with The Arsenal.

As Europe moves to rearm, there has been intense debate among EU governments about whether they should focus on buying European defense equipment.

The French government, for example, has argued that a ‘buy European’ policy is necessary to rebuild Europe’s atrophied defense industry. But others, such as Poland, have emphasized the need to fill capability gaps quickly, even if that means buying from abroad.

Over 5,000 respondents were asked whether it was more important to buy European defense equipment, even if it’s “more expensive and less capable,’” or whether Europe should prioritize value and capability even if that means buying from overseas.

Polish respondents expressed the strongest preference for prioritizing cost and capability over European purchasing.

So did over 40% of Germans and Spaniards, with roughly a quarter preferring to buy European hardware. However, among those who voted for of Spain’s left-wing SUMAR party in 2023, nearly half supported ‘buy European.’

In France, support for ‘buy European’ was slightly higher among people who voted for President Emmanuel Macron in 2022 than among those who voted for the nationalist Marine Le Pen. But in Italy, that position was most prevalent among those who voted for the left-wing Five Star Movement (M5S).

Respondents to the YouGov survey were also asked how they felt about defense spending. The results show broad support for maintaining or raising spending, but the top-line figures mask political splits in several countries.

Polish respondents from all across the political spectrum broadly supported strong national defense.

Not so in France, where people who’d voted for Le Pen in 2022 were nearly twice as likely (36%) as Macron voters (19%) to say defense spending is too high. 

Similarly in Germany, those who’d voted for the far-right Alternative for Germany this year were significantly more likely (36%) to want lower defense spending than those who’d voted for the centre-left SPD (16%), the centre-right CDU/CSU (11%) or the Greens (8%). 

But in Italy, a desire to cut defense spending is more prevalent on the populist left. Nearly half of M5S voters want less spending on defense. Strongest support for current spending was found among those who voted for Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party (42%) in 2022, while Lega voters were the most in favor of higher spending (34%).

At first glance, Spain shows the strongest support for higher defense spending of all the five countries. 

But the breakdown of that result reveals stark polarization. Support for more defense spending was highest among those who voted for the conservative Partido Popular (54%) and the far-right Vox (73%) in 2023. Only 19% of those who voted for Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s centre-left Socialist Workers’ Party gave the same answer. 54% of them support current spending levels, along with nearly half of SUMAR voters. 

According to NATO, estimated 2024 defense spending in the five countries was as follows:

Last Wednesday, the European Commission published its “Defense Industry Transformation Roadmap,” setting out plans to support technological innovation in defense. 

In addition to highlighting the soon-to-be-expanded role of the European Innovation Council (EIC) as an equity investor, as detailed in last week’s edition of The Arsenal, the Commission also announced a new €1 billion defense tech ‘fund-of-funds’ to be managed by the European Investment Bank (EIB). It aims to launch the fund in the first quarter of 2026, along with draft legislation for a new grant program called AGILE.

Details such as maximum grants and investments, as well as eligibility criteria, aren’t yet clear. Meanwhile, plans to boost knowledge transfer from Ukraine could help expand opportunities for Ukrainian defense firms to do business in the EU—and vice versa.

A Commission official told The Arsenal that while the EIC is focused on breakthrough technologies that may not be ready for years, the new EIB fund will focus solely on scaling up defense tech firms with a valuable product. The official said the new grant scheme, AGILE, will offer “small grants” for new defense technologies.

According to the “roadmap,” the grants will target quick projects “with time-to-result not exceeding 6-12 months.” It says the Commission will propose legislation for AGILE in Q1 2026.

To that end, the Commission is also planning to turn its EU Defense Innovation Office (EUDIO) in Kyiv into the EU Defense Industry Office, for accelerating knowledge transfer from Ukraine to the EU. 

Additionally, the Commission wants EU member states to allocate at least 10% of armament procurement budgets to the development of disruptive technologies. Advice on achieving that goal is expected in the second quarter of next year. 

A broad plan of Commission activities for 2026, published on 21 October, already indicated plans to draft a revision of the EU’s defense procurement laws in Q3 2026.